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authorGeorg2021-07-25 02:28:02 +0200
committerGeorg2021-07-25 02:28:02 +0200
commit87d1e58488cbfa6a27ba9500f99e1a2fa17b2977 (patch)
treea0dcbc80bd777a9a7cb9972e81b7611a3128adc4 /ergo
parent6a0165ffc8454fc07f1d45d021dd8b65971ae811 (diff)
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Ergo configuration
Signed-off-by: Georg <georg@lysergic.dev>
Diffstat (limited to 'ergo')
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+# oragono IRCd config
+
+# network configuration
+network:
+ # name of the network
+ name: LibertaCasa
+
+# server configuration
+server:
+ # server name
+ name: irc.liberta.casa
+
+ # addresses to listen on
+ listeners:
+ # The standard plaintext port for IRC is 6667. Allowing plaintext over the
+ # public Internet poses serious security and privacy issues. Accordingly,
+ # we recommend using plaintext only on local (loopback) interfaces:
+ # "127.0.0.1:6667": # (loopback ipv4, localhost-only)
+ # "[::1]:6667": # (loopback ipv6, localhost-only)
+ # If you need to serve plaintext on public interfaces, comment out the above
+ # two lines and uncomment the line below (which listens on all interfaces):
+ # ":6667":
+ # Alternately, if you have a TLS certificate issued by a recognized CA,
+ # you can configure port 6667 as an STS-only listener that only serves
+ # "redirects" to the TLS port, but doesn't allow chat. See the manual
+ # for details.
+
+ # The standard SSL/TLS port for IRC is 6697. This will listen on all interfaces:
+
+ #For public/internet connections for IRC
+ "81.16.19.64:6697":
+ tls:
+ key: /mnt/gluster01/oragono/sec/privkey.pem
+ cert: /mnt/gluster01/oragono/sec/fullchain.pem
+ # 'proxy' should typically be false. It's only for Kubernetes-style load
+ # balancing that does not terminate TLS, but sends an initial PROXY line
+ # in plaintext.
+ proxy: false
+
+ #For LAN connections for IRC
+ "192.168.0.110:6697":
+ tls:
+ key: /mnt/gluster01/oragono/sec/privkey.pem
+ cert: /mnt/gluster01/oragono/sec/fullchain.pem
+ proxy: false
+
+ #For localhost connections for IRC from/to the local TOR router
+ "127.0.0.2:6668":
+ tor: true
+
+ #For LAN connections for KIWI and GAMJA (LAN listener deprecated - consider replacing with 127.0.0.x)
+ "192.168.0.110:8068":
+ websocket: true
+
+ #For localhost connections for KIWI from/to the local TOR router (through NGINX)
+ "127.0.0.2:6669":
+ tor: true
+ websocket: true
+
+ #For secure localhost connections (used by matrix-appservice-irc)
+ "127.0.0.2:6697":
+ tls:
+ key: /mnt/gluster01/oragono/sec/privkey.pem
+ cert: /mnt/gluster01/oragono/sec/fullchain.pem
+ proxy: false
+
+ #For insecure localhost connections (used by matrix-appservice-irc if it's too stupid to validate our certificate)
+ "127.0.0.2:6667":
+
+ "127.0.0.1:6667":
+
+ # Example of a Unix domain socket for proxying:
+ #"/tmp/oragono_websocket":
+ # websocket: true
+ # server.enforce-utf8: true
+
+
+ # Example of a Tor listener: any connection that comes in on this listener will
+ # be considered a Tor connection. It is strongly recommended that this listener
+ # *not* be on a public interface --- it should be on 127.0.0.0/8 or unix domain:
+ # "/hidden_service_sockets/oragono_tor_sock":
+ # tor: true
+
+ # sets the permissions for Unix listen sockets. on a typical Linux system,
+ # the default is 0775 or 0755, which prevents other users/groups from connecting
+ # to the socket. With 0777, it behaves like a normal TCP socket
+ # where anyone can connect.
+ unix-bind-mode: 0777
+
+ # configure the behavior of Tor listeners (ignored if you didn't enable any):
+ tor-listeners:
+ # if this is true, connections from Tor must authenticate with SASL
+ require-sasl: false
+
+ # what hostname should be displayed for Tor connections?
+ vhost: "tor-i2p.lc.hidden"
+
+ # allow at most this many connections at once (0 for no limit):
+ max-connections: 128
+
+ # connection throttling (limit how many connection attempts are allowed at once):
+ throttle-duration: 10m
+ # set to 0 to disable throttling:
+ max-connections-per-duration: 64
+
+ # strict transport security, to get clients to automagically use TLS
+ sts:
+ # whether to advertise STS
+ #
+ # to stop advertising STS, leave this enabled and set 'duration' below to "0". this will
+ # advertise to connecting users that the STS policy they have saved is no longer valid
+ enabled: false
+
+ # how long clients should be forced to use TLS for.
+ # setting this to a too-long time will mean bad things if you later remove your TLS.
+ # the default duration below is 1 month, 2 days and 5 minutes.
+ duration: 1mo2d5m
+
+ # tls port - you should be listening on this port above
+ port: 6697
+
+ # should clients include this STS policy when they ship their inbuilt preload lists?
+ preload: false
+
+ # casemapping controls what kinds of strings are permitted as identifiers (nicknames,
+ # channel names, account names, etc.), and how they are normalized for case.
+ # with the recommended default of 'precis', utf-8 identifiers that are "sane"
+ # (according to RFC 8265) are allowed, and the server additionally tries to protect
+ # against confusable characters ("homoglyph attacks").
+ # the other options are 'ascii' (traditional ASCII-only identifiers), and 'permissive',
+ # which allows identifiers to contain unusual characters like emoji, but makes users
+ # vulnerable to homoglyph attacks. unless you're really confident in your decision,
+ # we recommend leaving this value at its default (changing it once the network is
+ # already up and running is problematic).
+ casemapping: "precis"
+
+ # enforce-utf8 controls whether the server will preemptively discard non-UTF8
+ # messages (since they cannot be relayed to websocket clients), or will allow
+ # them and relay them to non-websocket clients (as in traditional IRC).
+ enforce-utf8: true
+
+ # whether to look up user hostnames with reverse DNS
+ # (to suppress this for privacy purposes, use the ip-cloaking options below)
+ lookup-hostnames: true
+ # whether to confirm hostname lookups using "forward-confirmed reverse DNS", i.e., for
+ # any hostname returned from reverse DNS, resolve it back to an IP address and reject it
+ # unless it matches the connecting IP
+ forward-confirm-hostnames: true
+
+ # use ident protocol to get usernames
+ check-ident: false
+
+
+ # ignore the supplied user/ident string from the USER command, always setting user/ident
+ # to the following literal value; this can potentially reduce confusion and simplify bans.
+ # the value must begin with a '~' character. comment out / omit to disable:
+ coerce-ident: '~u'
+
+ # password to login to the server
+ # generated using "oragono genpasswd"
+ #password: ""
+
+ # motd filename
+ # if you change the motd, you should move it to ircd.motd
+ motd: /mnt/gluster01/oragono/ircd.motd
+
+
+ # motd formatting codes
+ # if this is true, the motd is escaped using formatting codes like $c, $b, and $i
+ motd-formatting: true
+
+ # relaying using the RELAYMSG command
+ relaymsg:
+ # is relaymsg enabled at all?
+ enabled: true
+
+ # which character(s) are reserved for relayed nicks?
+ separators: "/"
+
+ # can channel operators use RELAYMSG in their channels?
+ # our implementation of RELAYMSG makes it safe for chanops to use without the
+ # possibility of real users being silently spoofed
+ available-to-chanops: true
+
+
+ # addresses/CIDRs the PROXY command can be used from
+ # this should be restricted to 127.0.0.1/8 and ::1/128 (unless you have a good reason)
+ # you should also add these addresses to the connection limits and throttling exemption lists
+ proxy-allowed-from:
+ - localhost
+ # - "192.168.1.1"
+ # - "192.168.10.1/24"
+ - 192.168.0.10
+ - 192.168.0.110
+
+ # controls the use of the WEBIRC command (by IRC<->web interfaces, bouncers and similar)
+ webirc:
+ # one webirc block -- should correspond to one set of gateways
+ -
+ # SHA-256 fingerprint of the TLS certificate the gateway must use to connect
+ # (comment this out to use passwords only)
+ # fingerprint: "abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789"
+
+ # password the gateway uses to connect, made with oragono genpasswd
+ password: "$WEBIRC1"
+
+ # addresses/CIDRs that can use this webirc command
+ # you should also add these addresses to the connection limits and throttling exemption lists
+ hosts:
+ - localhost
+ # - "192.168.1.1"
+ # - "192.168.10.1/24"
+
+ -
+ password: "$WEBIRC2"
+
+ hosts:
+ - localhost
+
+ -
+ password: "$WEBIRC3"
+
+ hosts:
+ - localhost
+
+ -
+ password: "$WEBIRC4"
+
+ hosts:
+ - localhost
+
+ - # Convos
+ password: "$WEBIRC5"
+
+ hosts:
+ - localhost
+
+ - # Biboumi
+ password: "$WEBIRC6"
+
+ hosts:
+ - localhost
+
+ - # Webreg
+ password: "$WEBIRC7"
+
+ hosts:
+ - localhost
+
+ #-
+ # password: "$WEBIRC8"
+ #
+ # hosts:
+ # - "45.157.178.113"
+
+ #-
+ # password: "$WEBIRC9"
+
+ # hosts:
+ # - "45.157.178.113"
+
+ # allow use of the RESUME extension over plaintext connections:
+ # do not enable this unless the ircd is only accessible over internal networks
+ allow-plaintext-resume: false
+
+ # maximum length of clients' sendQ in bytes
+ # this should be big enough to hold bursts of channel/direct messages
+ max-sendq: 96k
+
+ # compatibility with legacy clients
+ compatibility:
+ # many clients require that the final parameter of certain messages be an
+ # RFC1459 trailing parameter, i.e., prefixed with :, whether or not this is
+ # actually required. this forces Oragono to send those parameters
+ # as trailings. this is recommended unless you're testing clients for conformance;
+ # defaults to true when unset for that reason.
+ force-trailing: true
+
+ # some clients (ZNC 1.6.x and lower, Pidgin 2.12 and lower) do not
+ # respond correctly to SASL messages with the server name as a prefix:
+ # https://github.com/znc/znc/issues/1212
+ # this works around that bug, allowing them to use SASL.
+ send-unprefixed-sasl: true
+
+ allow-truncation: true
+ # IP-based DoS protection
+ ip-limits:
+ # whether to limit the total number of concurrent connections per IP/CIDR
+ count: true
+ # maximum concurrent connections per IP/CIDR
+ max-concurrent-connections: 16
+
+ # whether to restrict the rate of new connections per IP/CIDR
+ throttle: true
+ # how long to keep track of connections for
+ window: 10m
+ # maximum number of new connections per IP/CIDR within the given duration
+ max-connections-per-window: 32
+ # how long to ban offenders for. after banning them, the number of connections is
+ # reset, which lets you use /UNDLINE to unban people
+ throttle-ban-duration: 10m
+
+ # how wide the CIDR should be for IPv4 (a /32 is a fully specified IPv4 address)
+ cidr-len-ipv4: 32
+ # how wide the CIDR should be for IPv6 (a /64 is the typical prefix assigned
+ # by an ISP to an individual customer for their LAN)
+ cidr-len-ipv6: 64
+
+ # IPs/networks which are exempted from connection limits
+ exempted:
+ - "localhost"
+ - "127.0.0.1"
+ - "127.0.0.2"
+ # - "45.85.218.46"
+ # - "172.17.0.1"
+ - 192.168.0.110
+ # - "2001:0db8::/32"
+
+ # custom connection limits for certain IPs/networks. note that CIDR
+ # widths defined here override the default CIDR width --- the limit
+ # will apply to the entire CIDR no matter how large or small it is
+ custom-limits:
+ # "8.8.0.0/16":
+ # max-concurrent-connections: 128
+ # max-connections-per-window: 1024
+
+
+
+ ip-check-script:
+ enabled: false
+ command: "/opt/oragono/oragono-dnsbl"
+ # constant list of args to pass to the command; the actual query
+ # and result are transmitted over stdin/stdout:
+ args: ['/opt/oragono/config.yaml']
+ # timeout for process execution, after which we send a SIGTERM:
+ timeout: 9s
+ # how long after the SIGTERM before we follow up with a SIGKILL:
+ kill-timeout: 1s
+ # how many scripts are allowed to run at once? 0 for no limit:
+ max-concurrency: 64
+
+
+
+ # IP cloaking hides users' IP addresses from other users and from channel admins
+ # (but not from server admins), while still allowing channel admins to ban
+ # offending IP addresses or networks. In place of hostnames derived from reverse
+ # DNS, users see fake domain names like pwbs2ui4377257x8.oragono. These names are
+ # generated deterministically from the underlying IP address, but if the underlying
+ # IP is not already known, it is infeasible to recover it from the cloaked name.
+ ip-cloaking:
+ # whether to enable IP cloaking
+ enabled: true
+
+ # whether to use these cloak settings (specifically, `netname` and `num-bits`)
+ # to produce unique hostnames for always-on clients. you can enable this even if
+ # you disabled IP cloaking for normal clients above. if this is disabled,
+ # always-on clients will all have an identical hostname (the server name).
+ enabled-for-always-on: true
+
+ # fake TLD at the end of the hostname, e.g., pwbs2ui4377257x8.oragono
+ netname: "liberta.casa"
+
+ # secret key to prevent dictionary attacks against cloaked IPs
+ # any high-entropy secret is valid for this purpose:
+ # you MUST generate a new one for your installation.
+ # suggestion: use the output of `oragono mksecret`
+ # note that rotating this key will invalidate all existing ban masks.
+ secret: "$CLOAKSEC"
+
+ # name of an environment variable to pull the secret from, for use with
+ # k8s secret distribution:
+ # secret-environment-variable: "ORAGONO_CLOAKING_SECRET"
+
+ # the cloaked hostname is derived only from the CIDR (most significant bits
+ # of the IP address), up to a configurable number of bits. this is the
+ # granularity at which bans will take effect for IPv4. Note that changing
+ # this value will invalidate any stored bans.
+ cidr-len-ipv4: 32
+
+ # analogous granularity for IPv6
+ cidr-len-ipv6: 64
+
+ # number of bits of hash output to include in the cloaked hostname.
+ # more bits means less likelihood of distinct IPs colliding,
+ # at the cost of a longer cloaked hostname. if this value is set to 0,
+ # all users will receive simply `netname` as their cloaked hostname.
+ num-bits: 64
+
+ # secure-nets identifies IPs and CIDRs which are secure at layer 3,
+ # for example, because they are on a trusted internal LAN or a VPN.
+ # plaintext connections from these IPs and CIDRs will be considered
+ # secure (clients will receive the +Z mode and be allowed to resume
+ # or reattach to secure connections). note that loopback IPs are always
+ # considered secure:
+ secure-nets:
+ # - "10.0.0.0/8"
+
+ # the hostname used by "services", e.g., NickServ, defaults to "localhost",
+ # e.g., `NickServ!NickServ@localhost`. uncomment this to override:
+ #override-services-hostname: "liberta.casa"
+
+# account options
+accounts:
+ # is account authentication enabled, i.e., can users log into existing accounts?
+ authentication-enabled: true
+
+ # account registration
+ registration:
+ # can users register new accounts for themselves? if this is false, operators with
+ # the `accreg` capability can still create accounts with `/NICKSERV SAREGISTER`
+ enabled: true
+
+ allow-before-connect: true
+
+ # global throttle on new account creation
+ throttling:
+ enabled: true
+ # window
+ duration: 10m
+ # number of attempts allowed within the window
+ max-attempts: 30
+
+ # this is the bcrypt cost we'll use for account passwords
+ bcrypt-cost: 4
+
+ # length of time a user has to verify their account before it can be re-registered
+ #verify-timeout: "32h"
+
+ # callbacks to allow
+ #enabled-callbacks:
+ # - mailto
+
+ # example configuration for sending verification emails via a local mail relay
+ #callbacks:
+ # mailto:
+ # sender: "admin@liberta.casa"
+ # require-tls: true
+ # dkim:
+ # domain: "liberta.casa"
+ # selector: "20200701"
+ # key-file: "dkim.key"
+
+ # throttle account login attempts (to prevent either password guessing, or DoS
+ # attacks on the server aimed at forcing repeated expensive bcrypt computations)
+ login-throttling:
+ enabled: true
+
+ # window
+ duration: 1m
+
+ # number of attempts allowed within the window
+ max-attempts: 3
+
+ # some clients (notably Pidgin and Hexchat) offer only a single password field,
+ # which makes it impossible to specify a separate server password (for the PASS
+ # command) and SASL password. if this option is set to true, a client that
+ # successfully authenticates with SASL will not be required to send
+ # PASS as well, so it can be configured to authenticate with SASL only.
+ skip-server-password: false
+
+
+ # enable login to accounts via the PASS command, e.g., PASS account:password
+ # this is sometimes useful for compatibility with old clients that don't support SASL
+ login-via-pass-command: true
+
+ # require-sasl controls whether clients are required to have accounts
+ # (and sign into them using SASL) to connect to the server
+ require-sasl:
+ # if this is enabled, all clients must authenticate with SASL while connecting
+ enabled: false
+
+ # IPs/CIDRs which are exempted from the account requirement
+ exempted:
+ - "localhost"
+ - "127.0.0.1"
+ - "127.0.0.2"
+ # - '10.10.0.0/16'
+
+ # nick-reservation controls how, and whether, nicknames are linked to accounts
+ nick-reservation:
+ # is there any enforcement of reserved nicknames?
+ enabled: true
+
+ # how many nicknames, in addition to the account name, can be reserved?
+ additional-nick-limit: 2
+
+ # method describes how nickname reservation is handled
+ # timeout: let the user change to the registered nickname, give them X seconds
+ # to login and then rename them if they haven't done so
+ # strict: don't let the user change to the registered nickname unless they're
+ # already logged-in using SASL or NickServ
+ # optional: no enforcement by default, but allow users to opt in to
+ # the enforcement level of their choice
+ #
+ # 'optional' matches the behavior of other NickServs, but 'strict' is
+ # preferable if all your users can enable SASL.
+ method: strict
+
+ # allow users to set their own nickname enforcement status, e.g.,
+ # to opt out of strict enforcement
+ allow-custom-enforcement: false
+
+ # format for guest nicknames:
+ # 1. these nicknames cannot be registered or reserved
+ # 2. if a client is automatically renamed by the server,
+ # this is the template that will be used (e.g., Guest-nccj6rgmt97cg)
+ # 3. if enforce-guest-format (see below) is enabled, clients without
+ # a registered account will have this template applied to their
+ # nicknames (e.g., 'katie' will become 'Guest-katie')
+ guest-nickname-format: "JDoe-*"
+
+ # when enabled, forces users not logged into an account to use
+ # a nickname matching the guest template. a caveat: this may prevent
+ # users from choosing nicknames in scripts different from the guest
+ # nickname format.
+ force-guest-format: false
+
+ # when enabled, forces users logged into an account to use the
+ # account name as their nickname. when combined with strict nickname
+ # enforcement, this lets users treat nicknames and account names
+ # as equivalent for the purpose of ban/invite/exception lists.
+ force-nick-equals-account: true
+
+ # parallel setting to force-nick-equals-account: if true, this forbids
+ # anonymous users (i.e., users not logged into an account) to change their
+ # nickname after the initial connection is complete
+ forbid-anonymous-nick-changes: false
+
+
+
+ # multiclient controls whether oragono allows multiple connections to
+ # attach to the same client/nickname identity; this is part of the
+ # functionality traditionally provided by a bouncer like ZNC
+ multiclient:
+ # when disabled, each connection must use a separate nickname (as is the
+ # typical behavior of IRC servers). when enabled, a new connection that
+ # has authenticated with SASL can associate itself with an existing
+ # client
+ enabled: true
+
+ # if this is disabled, clients have to opt in to bouncer functionality
+ # using nickserv or the cap system. if it's enabled, they can opt out
+ # via nickserv
+ allowed-by-default: true
+
+ # whether to allow clients that remain on the server even
+ # when they have no active connections. The possible values are:
+ # "disabled", "opt-in", "opt-out", or "mandatory".
+ always-on: "opt-in"
+
+ auto-away: "opt-in"
+ # vhosts controls the assignment of vhosts (strings displayed in place of the user's
+ # hostname/IP) by the HostServ service
+ vhosts:
+ # are vhosts enabled at all?
+ enabled: true
+
+ # maximum length of a vhost
+ max-length: 64
+
+ # regexp for testing the validity of a vhost
+ # (make sure any changes you make here are RFC-compliant)
+ valid-regexp: '^[0-9A-Za-z.\-_/]+$'
+
+ # options controlling users requesting vhosts:
+ user-requests:
+ # can users request vhosts at all? if this is false, operators with the
+ # 'vhosts' capability can still assign vhosts manually
+ enabled: true
+
+ # if uncommented, all new vhost requests will be dumped into the given
+ # channel, so opers can review them as they are sent in. ensure that you
+ # have registered and restricted the channel appropriately before you
+ # uncomment this.
+ #channel: "#vhosts"
+
+ # after a user's vhost has been approved or rejected, they need to wait
+ # this long (starting from the time of their original request)
+ # before they can request a new one.
+ cooldown: 30m
+
+ # vhosts that users can take without approval, using `/HS TAKE`
+ offer-list:
+ #- "liberta.casa"
+
+ # modes that are set by default when a user connects
+ # if unset, no user modes will be set by default
+ # +i is invisible (a user's channels are hidden from whois replies)
+ # see /QUOTE HELP umodes for more user modes
+ default-user-modes: +iT
+
+
+
+# channel options
+channels:
+ # modes that are set when new channels are created
+ # +n is no-external-messages and +t is op-only-topic
+ # see /QUOTE HELP cmodes for more channel modes
+ default-modes: +nt
+
+ # how many channels can a client be in at once?
+ max-channels-per-client: 100
+
+ # if this is true, new channels can only be created by operators with the
+ # `chanreg` operator capability
+ operator-only-creation: false
+
+ # channel registration - requires an account
+ registration:
+ # can users register new channels?
+ enabled: true
+
+ # how many channels can each account register?
+ max-channels-per-account: 15
+
+ list-delay: 2s
+
+ invite-expiration: 24h
+
+# operator classes
+oper-classes:
+ # chat moderator: can ban/unban users from the server, join channels,
+ # fix mode issues and sort out vhosts.
+ "chat-moderator":
+ # title shown in WHOIS
+ title: Chat Moderator
+
+ # capability names
+ capabilities:
+ - "kill"
+ - "ban"
+ - "nofakelag"
+ - "roleplay"
+ - "relaymsg"
+ - "vhosts"
+ - "sajoin"
+ - "samode"
+ - "snomasks"
+ # server admin: has full control of the ircd, including nickname and
+ # channel registrations
+ "server-admin":
+ # title shown in WHOIS
+ title: Server Admin
+
+ # oper class this extends from
+ extends: "chat-moderator"
+
+ # capability names
+ capabilities:
+ - "rehash"
+ - "accreg"
+ - "chanreg"
+ - "history"
+ - "defcon"
+ - "massmessage"
+
+ "systems":
+ title: System
+ capabilities:
+ - "nofakelag"
+
+# ircd operators
+opers:
+ # operator named 'admin'
+
+ mogad0n:
+ # which capabilities this oper has access to
+ class: "server-admin"
+
+ # custom whois line
+ whois-line: ...
+
+ # custom hostname
+ vhost: "mph.monster"
+
+ # modes are the modes to auto-set upon opering-up
+ modes: +is acdjknoqtuxv
+
+ # operators can be authenticated either by password (with the /OPER command),
+ # or by certificate fingerprint, or both. if a password hash is set, then a
+ # password is required to oper up (e.g., /OPER dan mypassword). to generate
+ # the hash, use `oragono genpasswd`.
+ #password: "$OPPW1"
+
+ # if a SHA-256 certificate fingerprint is configured here, then it will be
+ # required to /OPER. if you comment out the password hash above, then you can
+ # /OPER without a password.
+ fingerprint: "$OPFP1"
+ # if 'auto' is set (and no password hash is set), operator permissions will be
+ # granted automatically as soon as you connect with the right fingerprint.
+ auto: true
+
+ katyusha:
+
+ class: "server-admin"
+
+ whois-line: ^_^
+
+ vhost: "bot"
+
+ hidden: true
+
+ modes: +is acdjknoqtuxv
+
+ password: "$OPPW2"
+
+
+ shodan:
+
+ class: "server-admin"
+
+ whois-line: ^_^
+
+ vhost: "bot.overs33r"
+
+ hidden: true
+
+ modes: +is acdjknoqtuxv
+
+ password: "$OPPW3"
+
+
+ cranberry:
+
+ class: "server-admin"
+
+ whois-line: Love
+
+ vhost: "cranberry.juice"
+
+ modes: +is acdjknoqtuxv
+
+ fingerprint: "$OPFP2"
+
+ auto: true
+
+
+ Mikaela:
+
+ class: "server-admin"
+
+ whois-line: Meow
+
+ vhost: "darkness.dreamer.of.cats"
+
+ modes: +is acdjknoqtuxv
+
+ fingerprint: "$OPFP3"
+
+ auto: true
+
+
+ TripityDudeGuy:
+
+ class: "chat-moderator"
+
+ whois-line: lol@rehab
+
+ vhost: "wood"
+
+ modes: +is acjknoqtuxv
+
+ #password: "$OPPW5"
+
+ fingerprint: "$OPFP4"
+
+ auto: true
+
+
+ exorcist:
+
+ class: "server-admin"
+
+ whois-line: F society
+
+ vhost: "libre.software"
+
+ modes: +is acdjknoqtuxv
+
+ password: "$OPPW6"
+
+
+ syslog:
+
+ class: "systems"
+
+ modes: +BTRi
+
+ password: "$OPPW7"
+
+ # logging, takes inspiration from Insp
+logging:
+ -
+ # how to log these messages
+ #
+ # file log to given target filename
+ # stdout log to stdout
+ # stderr log to stderr
+ # (you can specify multiple methods, e.g., to log to both stderr and a file)
+ method: stderr
+
+ # filename to log to, if file method is selected
+ # filename: ircd.log
+
+ # type(s) of logs to keep here. you can use - to exclude those types
+ #
+ # exclusions take precedent over inclusions, so if you exclude a type it will NEVER
+ # be logged, even if you explicitly include it
+ #
+ # useful types include:
+ # * everything (usually used with exclusing some types below)
+ # server server startup, rehash, and shutdown events
+ # accounts account registration and authentication
+ # channels channel creation and operations
+ # commands command calling and operations
+ # opers oper actions, authentication, etc
+ # services actions related to NickServ, ChanServ, etc.
+ # internal unexpected runtime behavior, including potential bugs
+ # userinput raw lines sent by users
+ # useroutput raw lines sent to users
+ type: "* -userinput -useroutput"
+
+ # one of: debug info warn error
+ level: debug
+ #-
+ # # example of a file log that avoids logging IP addresses
+ # method: file
+ # filename: ircd.log
+ # type: "* -userinput -useroutput -localconnect -localconnect-ip"
+ # level: debug
+
+# debug options
+debug:
+ # when enabled, oragono will attempt to recover from certain kinds of
+ # client-triggered runtime errors that would normally crash the server.
+ # this makes the server more resilient to DoS, but could result in incorrect
+ # behavior. deployments that would prefer to "start from scratch", e.g., by
+ # letting the process crash and auto-restarting it with systemd, can set
+ # this to false.
+ recover-from-errors: true
+
+ # optionally expose a pprof http endpoint: https://golang.org/pkg/net/http/pprof/
+ # it is strongly recommended that you don't expose this on a public interface;
+ # if you need to access it remotely, you can use an SSH tunnel.
+ # set to `null`, "", leave blank, or omit to disable
+ # pprof-listener: "localhost:6060"
+
+# datastore configuration
+datastore:
+ # path to the datastore
+ path: /mnt/gluster01/oragono/ircd.db
+
+ # if the database schema requires an upgrade, `autoupgrade` will attempt to
+ # perform it automatically on startup. the database will be backed
+ # up, and if the upgrade fails, the original database will be restored.
+ autoupgrade: true
+
+ # connection information for MySQL (currently only used for persistent history):
+ mysql:
+ enabled: false
+ host: "localhost"
+ # port is unnecessary for connections via unix domain socket:
+ #port: 3306
+ user: "oragono"
+ password: "hunter2"
+ history-database: "oragono_history"
+ timeout: 3s
+
+# languages config
+languages:
+ # whether to load languages
+ enabled: false
+
+ # default language to use for new clients
+ # 'en' is the default English language in the code
+ default: en
+
+ # which directory contains our language files
+ path: /opt/oragono/languages
+
+# limits - these need to be the same across the network
+limits:
+ # nicklen is the max nick length allowed
+ nicklen: 32
+
+ # identlen is the max ident length allowed
+ identlen: 20
+
+ # channellen is the max channel length allowed
+ channellen: 64
+
+ # awaylen is the maximum length of an away message
+ awaylen: 390
+
+ # kicklen is the maximum length of a kick message
+ kicklen: 390
+
+ # topiclen is the maximum length of a channel topic
+ topiclen: 390
+
+ # maximum number of monitor entries a client can have
+ monitor-entries: 100
+
+ # whowas entries to store
+ whowas-entries: 100
+
+ # maximum length of channel lists (beI modes)
+ chan-list-modes: 60
+
+ # maximum number of messages to accept during registration (prevents
+ # DoS / resource exhaustion attacks):
+ registration-messages: 1024
+
+ # message length limits for the new multiline cap
+ multiline:
+ max-bytes: 4096 # 0 means disabled
+ max-lines: 100 # 0 means no limit
+
+# fakelag: prevents clients from spamming commands too rapidly
+fakelag:
+ # whether to enforce fakelag
+ enabled: true
+
+ # time unit for counting command rates
+ window: 1s
+
+ # clients can send this many commands without fakelag being imposed
+ burst-limit: 5
+
+ # once clients have exceeded their burst allowance, they can send only
+ # this many commands per `window`:
+ messages-per-window: 2
+
+ # client status resets to the default state if they go this long without
+ # sending any commands:
+ cooldown: 2s
+
+
+# the roleplay commands are semi-standardized extensions to IRC that allow
+# sending and receiving messages from pseudo-nicknames. this can be used either
+# for actual roleplaying, or for bridging IRC with other protocols.
+roleplay:
+ # are roleplay commands enabled at all? (channels and clients still have to
+ # opt in individually with the +E mode)
+ enabled: true
+
+ # require the "roleplay" oper capability to send roleplay messages?
+ require-oper: false
+
+ # require channel operator permissions to send roleplay messages?
+ require-chanops: true
+
+ # add the real nickname, in parentheses, to the end of every roleplay message?
+ add-suffix: false
+
+# message history tracking, for the RESUME extension and possibly other uses in future
+history:
+ # should we store messages for later playback?
+ # by default, messages are stored in RAM only; they do not persist
+ # across server restarts. however, you should not enable this unless you understand
+ # how it interacts with the GDPR and/or any data privacy laws that apply
+ # in your country and the countries of your users.
+ enabled: true
+
+ # how many channel-specific events (messages, joins, parts) should be tracked per channel?
+ channel-length: 2048
+
+ # how many direct messages and notices should be tracked per user?
+ client-length: 256
+
+ # how long should we try to preserve messages?
+ # if `autoresize-window` is 0, the in-memory message buffers are preallocated to
+ # their maximum length. if it is nonzero, the buffers are initially small and
+ # are dynamically expanded up to the maximum length. if the buffer is full
+ # and the oldest message is older than `autoresize-window`, then it will overwrite
+ # the oldest message rather than resize; otherwise, it will expand if possible.
+ autoresize-window: 3d
+
+ # number of messages to automatically play back on channel join (0 to disable):
+ autoreplay-on-join: 0
+
+ # maximum number of CHATHISTORY messages that can be
+ # requested at once (0 disables support for CHATHISTORY)
+ chathistory-maxmessages: 100
+
+ # maximum number of messages that can be replayed at once during znc emulation
+ # (znc.in/playback, or automatic replay on initial reattach to a persistent client):
+ znc-maxmessages: 2048
+
+ # options to delete old messages, or prevent them from being retrieved
+ restrictions:
+ # if this is set, messages older than this cannot be retrieved by anyone
+ # (and will eventually be deleted from persistent storage, if that's enabled)
+ expire-time: 1w
+
+ # if this is set, logged-in users cannot retrieve messages older than their
+ # account registration date, and logged-out users cannot retrieve messages
+ # older than their sign-on time (modulo grace-period, see below):
+ enforce-registration-date: false
+
+ # but if this is set, you can retrieve messages that are up to `grace-period`
+ # older than the above cutoff time. this is recommended to allow logged-out
+ # users to do session resumption / query history after disconnections.
+ grace-period: 1h
+
+ # options to store history messages in a persistent database (currently only MySQL):
+ persistent:
+ enabled: false
+
+ # store unregistered channel messages in the persistent database?
+ unregistered-channels: false
+
+ # for a registered channel, the channel owner can potentially customize
+ # the history storage setting. as the server operator, your options are
+ # 'disabled' (no persistent storage, regardless of per-channel setting),
+ # 'opt-in', 'opt-out', and 'mandatory' (force persistent storage, ignoring
+ # per-channel setting):
+ registered-channels: "opt-out"
+
+ # direct messages are only stored in the database for logged-in clients;
+ # you can control how they are stored here (same options as above).
+ # if you enable this, strict nickname reservation is strongly recommended
+ # as well.
+ direct-messages: "opt-out"
+
+ # options to control how messages are stored and deleted:
+ retention:
+ # allow users to delete their own messages from history?
+ allow-individual-delete: false
+ # options to control storage of TAGMSG
+ tagmsg-storage:
+ # by default, should TAGMSG be stored?
+ default: false
+
+ # if `default` is false, store TAGMSG containing any of these tags:
+ whitelist:
+ - "+draft/react"
+ - "react"