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author | Georg | 2021-07-25 02:28:02 +0200 |
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committer | Georg | 2021-07-25 02:28:02 +0200 |
commit | 87d1e58488cbfa6a27ba9500f99e1a2fa17b2977 (patch) | |
tree | a0dcbc80bd777a9a7cb9972e81b7611a3128adc4 | |
parent | 6a0165ffc8454fc07f1d45d021dd8b65971ae811 (diff) | |
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Ergo configuration
Signed-off-by: Georg <georg@lysergic.dev>
-rw-r--r-- | ergo/ircd.yaml | 1038 |
1 files changed, 1038 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/ergo/ircd.yaml b/ergo/ircd.yaml new file mode 100644 index 0000000..90ffe6d --- /dev/null +++ b/ergo/ircd.yaml @@ -0,0 +1,1038 @@ +# oragono IRCd config + +# network configuration +network: + # name of the network + name: LibertaCasa + +# server configuration +server: + # server name + name: irc.liberta.casa + + # addresses to listen on + listeners: + # The standard plaintext port for IRC is 6667. Allowing plaintext over the + # public Internet poses serious security and privacy issues. Accordingly, + # we recommend using plaintext only on local (loopback) interfaces: + # "127.0.0.1:6667": # (loopback ipv4, localhost-only) + # "[::1]:6667": # (loopback ipv6, localhost-only) + # If you need to serve plaintext on public interfaces, comment out the above + # two lines and uncomment the line below (which listens on all interfaces): + # ":6667": + # Alternately, if you have a TLS certificate issued by a recognized CA, + # you can configure port 6667 as an STS-only listener that only serves + # "redirects" to the TLS port, but doesn't allow chat. See the manual + # for details. + + # The standard SSL/TLS port for IRC is 6697. This will listen on all interfaces: + + #For public/internet connections for IRC + "81.16.19.64:6697": + tls: + key: /mnt/gluster01/oragono/sec/privkey.pem + cert: /mnt/gluster01/oragono/sec/fullchain.pem + # 'proxy' should typically be false. It's only for Kubernetes-style load + # balancing that does not terminate TLS, but sends an initial PROXY line + # in plaintext. + proxy: false + + #For LAN connections for IRC + "192.168.0.110:6697": + tls: + key: /mnt/gluster01/oragono/sec/privkey.pem + cert: /mnt/gluster01/oragono/sec/fullchain.pem + proxy: false + + #For localhost connections for IRC from/to the local TOR router + "127.0.0.2:6668": + tor: true + + #For LAN connections for KIWI and GAMJA (LAN listener deprecated - consider replacing with 127.0.0.x) + "192.168.0.110:8068": + websocket: true + + #For localhost connections for KIWI from/to the local TOR router (through NGINX) + "127.0.0.2:6669": + tor: true + websocket: true + + #For secure localhost connections (used by matrix-appservice-irc) + "127.0.0.2:6697": + tls: + key: /mnt/gluster01/oragono/sec/privkey.pem + cert: /mnt/gluster01/oragono/sec/fullchain.pem + proxy: false + + #For insecure localhost connections (used by matrix-appservice-irc if it's too stupid to validate our certificate) + "127.0.0.2:6667": + + "127.0.0.1:6667": + + # Example of a Unix domain socket for proxying: + #"/tmp/oragono_websocket": + # websocket: true + # server.enforce-utf8: true + + + # Example of a Tor listener: any connection that comes in on this listener will + # be considered a Tor connection. It is strongly recommended that this listener + # *not* be on a public interface --- it should be on 127.0.0.0/8 or unix domain: + # "/hidden_service_sockets/oragono_tor_sock": + # tor: true + + # sets the permissions for Unix listen sockets. on a typical Linux system, + # the default is 0775 or 0755, which prevents other users/groups from connecting + # to the socket. With 0777, it behaves like a normal TCP socket + # where anyone can connect. + unix-bind-mode: 0777 + + # configure the behavior of Tor listeners (ignored if you didn't enable any): + tor-listeners: + # if this is true, connections from Tor must authenticate with SASL + require-sasl: false + + # what hostname should be displayed for Tor connections? + vhost: "tor-i2p.lc.hidden" + + # allow at most this many connections at once (0 for no limit): + max-connections: 128 + + # connection throttling (limit how many connection attempts are allowed at once): + throttle-duration: 10m + # set to 0 to disable throttling: + max-connections-per-duration: 64 + + # strict transport security, to get clients to automagically use TLS + sts: + # whether to advertise STS + # + # to stop advertising STS, leave this enabled and set 'duration' below to "0". this will + # advertise to connecting users that the STS policy they have saved is no longer valid + enabled: false + + # how long clients should be forced to use TLS for. + # setting this to a too-long time will mean bad things if you later remove your TLS. + # the default duration below is 1 month, 2 days and 5 minutes. + duration: 1mo2d5m + + # tls port - you should be listening on this port above + port: 6697 + + # should clients include this STS policy when they ship their inbuilt preload lists? + preload: false + + # casemapping controls what kinds of strings are permitted as identifiers (nicknames, + # channel names, account names, etc.), and how they are normalized for case. + # with the recommended default of 'precis', utf-8 identifiers that are "sane" + # (according to RFC 8265) are allowed, and the server additionally tries to protect + # against confusable characters ("homoglyph attacks"). + # the other options are 'ascii' (traditional ASCII-only identifiers), and 'permissive', + # which allows identifiers to contain unusual characters like emoji, but makes users + # vulnerable to homoglyph attacks. unless you're really confident in your decision, + # we recommend leaving this value at its default (changing it once the network is + # already up and running is problematic). + casemapping: "precis" + + # enforce-utf8 controls whether the server will preemptively discard non-UTF8 + # messages (since they cannot be relayed to websocket clients), or will allow + # them and relay them to non-websocket clients (as in traditional IRC). + enforce-utf8: true + + # whether to look up user hostnames with reverse DNS + # (to suppress this for privacy purposes, use the ip-cloaking options below) + lookup-hostnames: true + # whether to confirm hostname lookups using "forward-confirmed reverse DNS", i.e., for + # any hostname returned from reverse DNS, resolve it back to an IP address and reject it + # unless it matches the connecting IP + forward-confirm-hostnames: true + + # use ident protocol to get usernames + check-ident: false + + + # ignore the supplied user/ident string from the USER command, always setting user/ident + # to the following literal value; this can potentially reduce confusion and simplify bans. + # the value must begin with a '~' character. comment out / omit to disable: + coerce-ident: '~u' + + # password to login to the server + # generated using "oragono genpasswd" + #password: "" + + # motd filename + # if you change the motd, you should move it to ircd.motd + motd: /mnt/gluster01/oragono/ircd.motd + + + # motd formatting codes + # if this is true, the motd is escaped using formatting codes like $c, $b, and $i + motd-formatting: true + + # relaying using the RELAYMSG command + relaymsg: + # is relaymsg enabled at all? + enabled: true + + # which character(s) are reserved for relayed nicks? + separators: "/" + + # can channel operators use RELAYMSG in their channels? + # our implementation of RELAYMSG makes it safe for chanops to use without the + # possibility of real users being silently spoofed + available-to-chanops: true + + + # addresses/CIDRs the PROXY command can be used from + # this should be restricted to 127.0.0.1/8 and ::1/128 (unless you have a good reason) + # you should also add these addresses to the connection limits and throttling exemption lists + proxy-allowed-from: + - localhost + # - "192.168.1.1" + # - "192.168.10.1/24" + - 192.168.0.10 + - 192.168.0.110 + + # controls the use of the WEBIRC command (by IRC<->web interfaces, bouncers and similar) + webirc: + # one webirc block -- should correspond to one set of gateways + - + # SHA-256 fingerprint of the TLS certificate the gateway must use to connect + # (comment this out to use passwords only) + # fingerprint: "abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789" + + # password the gateway uses to connect, made with oragono genpasswd + password: "$WEBIRC1" + + # addresses/CIDRs that can use this webirc command + # you should also add these addresses to the connection limits and throttling exemption lists + hosts: + - localhost + # - "192.168.1.1" + # - "192.168.10.1/24" + + - + password: "$WEBIRC2" + + hosts: + - localhost + + - + password: "$WEBIRC3" + + hosts: + - localhost + + - + password: "$WEBIRC4" + + hosts: + - localhost + + - # Convos + password: "$WEBIRC5" + + hosts: + - localhost + + - # Biboumi + password: "$WEBIRC6" + + hosts: + - localhost + + - # Webreg + password: "$WEBIRC7" + + hosts: + - localhost + + #- + # password: "$WEBIRC8" + # + # hosts: + # - "45.157.178.113" + + #- + # password: "$WEBIRC9" + + # hosts: + # - "45.157.178.113" + + # allow use of the RESUME extension over plaintext connections: + # do not enable this unless the ircd is only accessible over internal networks + allow-plaintext-resume: false + + # maximum length of clients' sendQ in bytes + # this should be big enough to hold bursts of channel/direct messages + max-sendq: 96k + + # compatibility with legacy clients + compatibility: + # many clients require that the final parameter of certain messages be an + # RFC1459 trailing parameter, i.e., prefixed with :, whether or not this is + # actually required. this forces Oragono to send those parameters + # as trailings. this is recommended unless you're testing clients for conformance; + # defaults to true when unset for that reason. + force-trailing: true + + # some clients (ZNC 1.6.x and lower, Pidgin 2.12 and lower) do not + # respond correctly to SASL messages with the server name as a prefix: + # https://github.com/znc/znc/issues/1212 + # this works around that bug, allowing them to use SASL. + send-unprefixed-sasl: true + + allow-truncation: true + # IP-based DoS protection + ip-limits: + # whether to limit the total number of concurrent connections per IP/CIDR + count: true + # maximum concurrent connections per IP/CIDR + max-concurrent-connections: 16 + + # whether to restrict the rate of new connections per IP/CIDR + throttle: true + # how long to keep track of connections for + window: 10m + # maximum number of new connections per IP/CIDR within the given duration + max-connections-per-window: 32 + # how long to ban offenders for. after banning them, the number of connections is + # reset, which lets you use /UNDLINE to unban people + throttle-ban-duration: 10m + + # how wide the CIDR should be for IPv4 (a /32 is a fully specified IPv4 address) + cidr-len-ipv4: 32 + # how wide the CIDR should be for IPv6 (a /64 is the typical prefix assigned + # by an ISP to an individual customer for their LAN) + cidr-len-ipv6: 64 + + # IPs/networks which are exempted from connection limits + exempted: + - "localhost" + - "127.0.0.1" + - "127.0.0.2" + # - "45.85.218.46" + # - "172.17.0.1" + - 192.168.0.110 + # - "2001:0db8::/32" + + # custom connection limits for certain IPs/networks. note that CIDR + # widths defined here override the default CIDR width --- the limit + # will apply to the entire CIDR no matter how large or small it is + custom-limits: + # "8.8.0.0/16": + # max-concurrent-connections: 128 + # max-connections-per-window: 1024 + + + + ip-check-script: + enabled: false + command: "/opt/oragono/oragono-dnsbl" + # constant list of args to pass to the command; the actual query + # and result are transmitted over stdin/stdout: + args: ['/opt/oragono/config.yaml'] + # timeout for process execution, after which we send a SIGTERM: + timeout: 9s + # how long after the SIGTERM before we follow up with a SIGKILL: + kill-timeout: 1s + # how many scripts are allowed to run at once? 0 for no limit: + max-concurrency: 64 + + + + # IP cloaking hides users' IP addresses from other users and from channel admins + # (but not from server admins), while still allowing channel admins to ban + # offending IP addresses or networks. In place of hostnames derived from reverse + # DNS, users see fake domain names like pwbs2ui4377257x8.oragono. These names are + # generated deterministically from the underlying IP address, but if the underlying + # IP is not already known, it is infeasible to recover it from the cloaked name. + ip-cloaking: + # whether to enable IP cloaking + enabled: true + + # whether to use these cloak settings (specifically, `netname` and `num-bits`) + # to produce unique hostnames for always-on clients. you can enable this even if + # you disabled IP cloaking for normal clients above. if this is disabled, + # always-on clients will all have an identical hostname (the server name). + enabled-for-always-on: true + + # fake TLD at the end of the hostname, e.g., pwbs2ui4377257x8.oragono + netname: "liberta.casa" + + # secret key to prevent dictionary attacks against cloaked IPs + # any high-entropy secret is valid for this purpose: + # you MUST generate a new one for your installation. + # suggestion: use the output of `oragono mksecret` + # note that rotating this key will invalidate all existing ban masks. + secret: "$CLOAKSEC" + + # name of an environment variable to pull the secret from, for use with + # k8s secret distribution: + # secret-environment-variable: "ORAGONO_CLOAKING_SECRET" + + # the cloaked hostname is derived only from the CIDR (most significant bits + # of the IP address), up to a configurable number of bits. this is the + # granularity at which bans will take effect for IPv4. Note that changing + # this value will invalidate any stored bans. + cidr-len-ipv4: 32 + + # analogous granularity for IPv6 + cidr-len-ipv6: 64 + + # number of bits of hash output to include in the cloaked hostname. + # more bits means less likelihood of distinct IPs colliding, + # at the cost of a longer cloaked hostname. if this value is set to 0, + # all users will receive simply `netname` as their cloaked hostname. + num-bits: 64 + + # secure-nets identifies IPs and CIDRs which are secure at layer 3, + # for example, because they are on a trusted internal LAN or a VPN. + # plaintext connections from these IPs and CIDRs will be considered + # secure (clients will receive the +Z mode and be allowed to resume + # or reattach to secure connections). note that loopback IPs are always + # considered secure: + secure-nets: + # - "10.0.0.0/8" + + # the hostname used by "services", e.g., NickServ, defaults to "localhost", + # e.g., `NickServ!NickServ@localhost`. uncomment this to override: + #override-services-hostname: "liberta.casa" + +# account options +accounts: + # is account authentication enabled, i.e., can users log into existing accounts? + authentication-enabled: true + + # account registration + registration: + # can users register new accounts for themselves? if this is false, operators with + # the `accreg` capability can still create accounts with `/NICKSERV SAREGISTER` + enabled: true + + allow-before-connect: true + + # global throttle on new account creation + throttling: + enabled: true + # window + duration: 10m + # number of attempts allowed within the window + max-attempts: 30 + + # this is the bcrypt cost we'll use for account passwords + bcrypt-cost: 4 + + # length of time a user has to verify their account before it can be re-registered + #verify-timeout: "32h" + + # callbacks to allow + #enabled-callbacks: + # - mailto + + # example configuration for sending verification emails via a local mail relay + #callbacks: + # mailto: + # sender: "admin@liberta.casa" + # require-tls: true + # dkim: + # domain: "liberta.casa" + # selector: "20200701" + # key-file: "dkim.key" + + # throttle account login attempts (to prevent either password guessing, or DoS + # attacks on the server aimed at forcing repeated expensive bcrypt computations) + login-throttling: + enabled: true + + # window + duration: 1m + + # number of attempts allowed within the window + max-attempts: 3 + + # some clients (notably Pidgin and Hexchat) offer only a single password field, + # which makes it impossible to specify a separate server password (for the PASS + # command) and SASL password. if this option is set to true, a client that + # successfully authenticates with SASL will not be required to send + # PASS as well, so it can be configured to authenticate with SASL only. + skip-server-password: false + + + # enable login to accounts via the PASS command, e.g., PASS account:password + # this is sometimes useful for compatibility with old clients that don't support SASL + login-via-pass-command: true + + # require-sasl controls whether clients are required to have accounts + # (and sign into them using SASL) to connect to the server + require-sasl: + # if this is enabled, all clients must authenticate with SASL while connecting + enabled: false + + # IPs/CIDRs which are exempted from the account requirement + exempted: + - "localhost" + - "127.0.0.1" + - "127.0.0.2" + # - '10.10.0.0/16' + + # nick-reservation controls how, and whether, nicknames are linked to accounts + nick-reservation: + # is there any enforcement of reserved nicknames? + enabled: true + + # how many nicknames, in addition to the account name, can be reserved? + additional-nick-limit: 2 + + # method describes how nickname reservation is handled + # timeout: let the user change to the registered nickname, give them X seconds + # to login and then rename them if they haven't done so + # strict: don't let the user change to the registered nickname unless they're + # already logged-in using SASL or NickServ + # optional: no enforcement by default, but allow users to opt in to + # the enforcement level of their choice + # + # 'optional' matches the behavior of other NickServs, but 'strict' is + # preferable if all your users can enable SASL. + method: strict + + # allow users to set their own nickname enforcement status, e.g., + # to opt out of strict enforcement + allow-custom-enforcement: false + + # format for guest nicknames: + # 1. these nicknames cannot be registered or reserved + # 2. if a client is automatically renamed by the server, + # this is the template that will be used (e.g., Guest-nccj6rgmt97cg) + # 3. if enforce-guest-format (see below) is enabled, clients without + # a registered account will have this template applied to their + # nicknames (e.g., 'katie' will become 'Guest-katie') + guest-nickname-format: "JDoe-*" + + # when enabled, forces users not logged into an account to use + # a nickname matching the guest template. a caveat: this may prevent + # users from choosing nicknames in scripts different from the guest + # nickname format. + force-guest-format: false + + # when enabled, forces users logged into an account to use the + # account name as their nickname. when combined with strict nickname + # enforcement, this lets users treat nicknames and account names + # as equivalent for the purpose of ban/invite/exception lists. + force-nick-equals-account: true + + # parallel setting to force-nick-equals-account: if true, this forbids + # anonymous users (i.e., users not logged into an account) to change their + # nickname after the initial connection is complete + forbid-anonymous-nick-changes: false + + + + # multiclient controls whether oragono allows multiple connections to + # attach to the same client/nickname identity; this is part of the + # functionality traditionally provided by a bouncer like ZNC + multiclient: + # when disabled, each connection must use a separate nickname (as is the + # typical behavior of IRC servers). when enabled, a new connection that + # has authenticated with SASL can associate itself with an existing + # client + enabled: true + + # if this is disabled, clients have to opt in to bouncer functionality + # using nickserv or the cap system. if it's enabled, they can opt out + # via nickserv + allowed-by-default: true + + # whether to allow clients that remain on the server even + # when they have no active connections. The possible values are: + # "disabled", "opt-in", "opt-out", or "mandatory". + always-on: "opt-in" + + auto-away: "opt-in" + # vhosts controls the assignment of vhosts (strings displayed in place of the user's + # hostname/IP) by the HostServ service + vhosts: + # are vhosts enabled at all? + enabled: true + + # maximum length of a vhost + max-length: 64 + + # regexp for testing the validity of a vhost + # (make sure any changes you make here are RFC-compliant) + valid-regexp: '^[0-9A-Za-z.\-_/]+$' + + # options controlling users requesting vhosts: + user-requests: + # can users request vhosts at all? if this is false, operators with the + # 'vhosts' capability can still assign vhosts manually + enabled: true + + # if uncommented, all new vhost requests will be dumped into the given + # channel, so opers can review them as they are sent in. ensure that you + # have registered and restricted the channel appropriately before you + # uncomment this. + #channel: "#vhosts" + + # after a user's vhost has been approved or rejected, they need to wait + # this long (starting from the time of their original request) + # before they can request a new one. + cooldown: 30m + + # vhosts that users can take without approval, using `/HS TAKE` + offer-list: + #- "liberta.casa" + + # modes that are set by default when a user connects + # if unset, no user modes will be set by default + # +i is invisible (a user's channels are hidden from whois replies) + # see /QUOTE HELP umodes for more user modes + default-user-modes: +iT + + + +# channel options +channels: + # modes that are set when new channels are created + # +n is no-external-messages and +t is op-only-topic + # see /QUOTE HELP cmodes for more channel modes + default-modes: +nt + + # how many channels can a client be in at once? + max-channels-per-client: 100 + + # if this is true, new channels can only be created by operators with the + # `chanreg` operator capability + operator-only-creation: false + + # channel registration - requires an account + registration: + # can users register new channels? + enabled: true + + # how many channels can each account register? + max-channels-per-account: 15 + + list-delay: 2s + + invite-expiration: 24h + +# operator classes +oper-classes: + # chat moderator: can ban/unban users from the server, join channels, + # fix mode issues and sort out vhosts. + "chat-moderator": + # title shown in WHOIS + title: Chat Moderator + + # capability names + capabilities: + - "kill" + - "ban" + - "nofakelag" + - "roleplay" + - "relaymsg" + - "vhosts" + - "sajoin" + - "samode" + - "snomasks" + # server admin: has full control of the ircd, including nickname and + # channel registrations + "server-admin": + # title shown in WHOIS + title: Server Admin + + # oper class this extends from + extends: "chat-moderator" + + # capability names + capabilities: + - "rehash" + - "accreg" + - "chanreg" + - "history" + - "defcon" + - "massmessage" + + "systems": + title: System + capabilities: + - "nofakelag" + +# ircd operators +opers: + # operator named 'admin' + + mogad0n: + # which capabilities this oper has access to + class: "server-admin" + + # custom whois line + whois-line: ... + + # custom hostname + vhost: "mph.monster" + + # modes are the modes to auto-set upon opering-up + modes: +is acdjknoqtuxv + + # operators can be authenticated either by password (with the /OPER command), + # or by certificate fingerprint, or both. if a password hash is set, then a + # password is required to oper up (e.g., /OPER dan mypassword). to generate + # the hash, use `oragono genpasswd`. + #password: "$OPPW1" + + # if a SHA-256 certificate fingerprint is configured here, then it will be + # required to /OPER. if you comment out the password hash above, then you can + # /OPER without a password. + fingerprint: "$OPFP1" + # if 'auto' is set (and no password hash is set), operator permissions will be + # granted automatically as soon as you connect with the right fingerprint. + auto: true + + katyusha: + + class: "server-admin" + + whois-line: ^_^ + + vhost: "bot" + + hidden: true + + modes: +is acdjknoqtuxv + + password: "$OPPW2" + + + shodan: + + class: "server-admin" + + whois-line: ^_^ + + vhost: "bot.overs33r" + + hidden: true + + modes: +is acdjknoqtuxv + + password: "$OPPW3" + + + cranberry: + + class: "server-admin" + + whois-line: Love + + vhost: "cranberry.juice" + + modes: +is acdjknoqtuxv + + fingerprint: "$OPFP2" + + auto: true + + + Mikaela: + + class: "server-admin" + + whois-line: Meow + + vhost: "darkness.dreamer.of.cats" + + modes: +is acdjknoqtuxv + + fingerprint: "$OPFP3" + + auto: true + + + TripityDudeGuy: + + class: "chat-moderator" + + whois-line: lol@rehab + + vhost: "wood" + + modes: +is acjknoqtuxv + + #password: "$OPPW5" + + fingerprint: "$OPFP4" + + auto: true + + + exorcist: + + class: "server-admin" + + whois-line: F society + + vhost: "libre.software" + + modes: +is acdjknoqtuxv + + password: "$OPPW6" + + + syslog: + + class: "systems" + + modes: +BTRi + + password: "$OPPW7" + + # logging, takes inspiration from Insp +logging: + - + # how to log these messages + # + # file log to given target filename + # stdout log to stdout + # stderr log to stderr + # (you can specify multiple methods, e.g., to log to both stderr and a file) + method: stderr + + # filename to log to, if file method is selected + # filename: ircd.log + + # type(s) of logs to keep here. you can use - to exclude those types + # + # exclusions take precedent over inclusions, so if you exclude a type it will NEVER + # be logged, even if you explicitly include it + # + # useful types include: + # * everything (usually used with exclusing some types below) + # server server startup, rehash, and shutdown events + # accounts account registration and authentication + # channels channel creation and operations + # commands command calling and operations + # opers oper actions, authentication, etc + # services actions related to NickServ, ChanServ, etc. + # internal unexpected runtime behavior, including potential bugs + # userinput raw lines sent by users + # useroutput raw lines sent to users + type: "* -userinput -useroutput" + + # one of: debug info warn error + level: debug + #- + # # example of a file log that avoids logging IP addresses + # method: file + # filename: ircd.log + # type: "* -userinput -useroutput -localconnect -localconnect-ip" + # level: debug + +# debug options +debug: + # when enabled, oragono will attempt to recover from certain kinds of + # client-triggered runtime errors that would normally crash the server. + # this makes the server more resilient to DoS, but could result in incorrect + # behavior. deployments that would prefer to "start from scratch", e.g., by + # letting the process crash and auto-restarting it with systemd, can set + # this to false. + recover-from-errors: true + + # optionally expose a pprof http endpoint: https://golang.org/pkg/net/http/pprof/ + # it is strongly recommended that you don't expose this on a public interface; + # if you need to access it remotely, you can use an SSH tunnel. + # set to `null`, "", leave blank, or omit to disable + # pprof-listener: "localhost:6060" + +# datastore configuration +datastore: + # path to the datastore + path: /mnt/gluster01/oragono/ircd.db + + # if the database schema requires an upgrade, `autoupgrade` will attempt to + # perform it automatically on startup. the database will be backed + # up, and if the upgrade fails, the original database will be restored. + autoupgrade: true + + # connection information for MySQL (currently only used for persistent history): + mysql: + enabled: false + host: "localhost" + # port is unnecessary for connections via unix domain socket: + #port: 3306 + user: "oragono" + password: "hunter2" + history-database: "oragono_history" + timeout: 3s + +# languages config +languages: + # whether to load languages + enabled: false + + # default language to use for new clients + # 'en' is the default English language in the code + default: en + + # which directory contains our language files + path: /opt/oragono/languages + +# limits - these need to be the same across the network +limits: + # nicklen is the max nick length allowed + nicklen: 32 + + # identlen is the max ident length allowed + identlen: 20 + + # channellen is the max channel length allowed + channellen: 64 + + # awaylen is the maximum length of an away message + awaylen: 390 + + # kicklen is the maximum length of a kick message + kicklen: 390 + + # topiclen is the maximum length of a channel topic + topiclen: 390 + + # maximum number of monitor entries a client can have + monitor-entries: 100 + + # whowas entries to store + whowas-entries: 100 + + # maximum length of channel lists (beI modes) + chan-list-modes: 60 + + # maximum number of messages to accept during registration (prevents + # DoS / resource exhaustion attacks): + registration-messages: 1024 + + # message length limits for the new multiline cap + multiline: + max-bytes: 4096 # 0 means disabled + max-lines: 100 # 0 means no limit + +# fakelag: prevents clients from spamming commands too rapidly +fakelag: + # whether to enforce fakelag + enabled: true + + # time unit for counting command rates + window: 1s + + # clients can send this many commands without fakelag being imposed + burst-limit: 5 + + # once clients have exceeded their burst allowance, they can send only + # this many commands per `window`: + messages-per-window: 2 + + # client status resets to the default state if they go this long without + # sending any commands: + cooldown: 2s + + +# the roleplay commands are semi-standardized extensions to IRC that allow +# sending and receiving messages from pseudo-nicknames. this can be used either +# for actual roleplaying, or for bridging IRC with other protocols. +roleplay: + # are roleplay commands enabled at all? (channels and clients still have to + # opt in individually with the +E mode) + enabled: true + + # require the "roleplay" oper capability to send roleplay messages? + require-oper: false + + # require channel operator permissions to send roleplay messages? + require-chanops: true + + # add the real nickname, in parentheses, to the end of every roleplay message? + add-suffix: false + +# message history tracking, for the RESUME extension and possibly other uses in future +history: + # should we store messages for later playback? + # by default, messages are stored in RAM only; they do not persist + # across server restarts. however, you should not enable this unless you understand + # how it interacts with the GDPR and/or any data privacy laws that apply + # in your country and the countries of your users. + enabled: true + + # how many channel-specific events (messages, joins, parts) should be tracked per channel? + channel-length: 2048 + + # how many direct messages and notices should be tracked per user? + client-length: 256 + + # how long should we try to preserve messages? + # if `autoresize-window` is 0, the in-memory message buffers are preallocated to + # their maximum length. if it is nonzero, the buffers are initially small and + # are dynamically expanded up to the maximum length. if the buffer is full + # and the oldest message is older than `autoresize-window`, then it will overwrite + # the oldest message rather than resize; otherwise, it will expand if possible. + autoresize-window: 3d + + # number of messages to automatically play back on channel join (0 to disable): + autoreplay-on-join: 0 + + # maximum number of CHATHISTORY messages that can be + # requested at once (0 disables support for CHATHISTORY) + chathistory-maxmessages: 100 + + # maximum number of messages that can be replayed at once during znc emulation + # (znc.in/playback, or automatic replay on initial reattach to a persistent client): + znc-maxmessages: 2048 + + # options to delete old messages, or prevent them from being retrieved + restrictions: + # if this is set, messages older than this cannot be retrieved by anyone + # (and will eventually be deleted from persistent storage, if that's enabled) + expire-time: 1w + + # if this is set, logged-in users cannot retrieve messages older than their + # account registration date, and logged-out users cannot retrieve messages + # older than their sign-on time (modulo grace-period, see below): + enforce-registration-date: false + + # but if this is set, you can retrieve messages that are up to `grace-period` + # older than the above cutoff time. this is recommended to allow logged-out + # users to do session resumption / query history after disconnections. + grace-period: 1h + + # options to store history messages in a persistent database (currently only MySQL): + persistent: + enabled: false + + # store unregistered channel messages in the persistent database? + unregistered-channels: false + + # for a registered channel, the channel owner can potentially customize + # the history storage setting. as the server operator, your options are + # 'disabled' (no persistent storage, regardless of per-channel setting), + # 'opt-in', 'opt-out', and 'mandatory' (force persistent storage, ignoring + # per-channel setting): + registered-channels: "opt-out" + + # direct messages are only stored in the database for logged-in clients; + # you can control how they are stored here (same options as above). + # if you enable this, strict nickname reservation is strongly recommended + # as well. + direct-messages: "opt-out" + + # options to control how messages are stored and deleted: + retention: + # allow users to delete their own messages from history? + allow-individual-delete: false + # options to control storage of TAGMSG + tagmsg-storage: + # by default, should TAGMSG be stored? + default: false + + # if `default` is false, store TAGMSG containing any of these tags: + whitelist: + - "+draft/react" + - "react" |