# oragono IRCd config # network configuration network: # name of the network name: LibertaCasa # server configuration server: # server name name: irc.liberta.casa # addresses to listen on listeners: # The standard plaintext port for IRC is 6667. Allowing plaintext over the # public Internet poses serious security and privacy issues. Accordingly, # we recommend using plaintext only on local (loopback) interfaces: # "127.0.0.1:6667": # (loopback ipv4, localhost-only) # "[::1]:6667": # (loopback ipv6, localhost-only) # If you need to serve plaintext on public interfaces, comment out the above # two lines and uncomment the line below (which listens on all interfaces): # ":6667": # Alternately, if you have a TLS certificate issued by a recognized CA, # you can configure port 6667 as an STS-only listener that only serves # "redirects" to the TLS port, but doesn't allow chat. See the manual # for details. # The standard SSL/TLS port for IRC is 6697. This will listen on all interfaces: #For public/internet connections for IRC "81.16.19.64:6697": tls: key: /mnt/gluster01/oragono/sec/privkey.pem cert: /mnt/gluster01/oragono/sec/fullchain.pem # 'proxy' should typically be false. It's only for Kubernetes-style load # balancing that does not terminate TLS, but sends an initial PROXY line # in plaintext. proxy: false #For LAN connections for IRC "192.168.0.110:6697": tls: key: /mnt/gluster01/oragono/sec/privkey.pem cert: /mnt/gluster01/oragono/sec/fullchain.pem proxy: false #For localhost connections for IRC from/to the local TOR router "127.0.0.2:6668": tor: true #For LAN connections for KIWI and GAMJA (LAN listener deprecated - consider replacing with 127.0.0.x) "192.168.0.110:8068": websocket: true #For localhost connections for KIWI from/to the local TOR router (through NGINX) "127.0.0.2:6669": tor: true websocket: true #For secure localhost connections (used by matrix-appservice-irc) "127.0.0.2:6697": tls: key: /mnt/gluster01/oragono/sec/privkey.pem cert: /mnt/gluster01/oragono/sec/fullchain.pem proxy: false #For insecure localhost connections (used by matrix-appservice-irc if it's too stupid to validate our certificate) "127.0.0.2:6667": "127.0.0.1:6667": # Example of a Unix domain socket for proxying: #"/tmp/oragono_websocket": # websocket: true # server.enforce-utf8: true # Example of a Tor listener: any connection that comes in on this listener will # be considered a Tor connection. It is strongly recommended that this listener # *not* be on a public interface --- it should be on 127.0.0.0/8 or unix domain: # "/hidden_service_sockets/oragono_tor_sock": # tor: true # sets the permissions for Unix listen sockets. on a typical Linux system, # the default is 0775 or 0755, which prevents other users/groups from connecting # to the socket. With 0777, it behaves like a normal TCP socket # where anyone can connect. unix-bind-mode: 0777 # configure the behavior of Tor listeners (ignored if you didn't enable any): tor-listeners: # if this is true, connections from Tor must authenticate with SASL require-sasl: false # what hostname should be displayed for Tor connections? vhost: "tor-i2p.lc.hidden" # allow at most this many connections at once (0 for no limit): max-connections: 128 # connection throttling (limit how many connection attempts are allowed at once): throttle-duration: 10m # set to 0 to disable throttling: max-connections-per-duration: 64 # strict transport security, to get clients to automagically use TLS sts: # whether to advertise STS # # to stop advertising STS, leave this enabled and set 'duration' below to "0". this will # advertise to connecting users that the STS policy they have saved is no longer valid enabled: false # how long clients should be forced to use TLS for. # setting this to a too-long time will mean bad things if you later remove your TLS. # the default duration below is 1 month, 2 days and 5 minutes. duration: 1mo2d5m # tls port - you should be listening on this port above port: 6697 # should clients include this STS policy when they ship their inbuilt preload lists? preload: false # casemapping controls what kinds of strings are permitted as identifiers (nicknames, # channel names, account names, etc.), and how they are normalized for case. # with the recommended default of 'precis', utf-8 identifiers that are "sane" # (according to RFC 8265) are allowed, and the server additionally tries to protect # against confusable characters ("homoglyph attacks"). # the other options are 'ascii' (traditional ASCII-only identifiers), and 'permissive', # which allows identifiers to contain unusual characters like emoji, but makes users # vulnerable to homoglyph attacks. unless you're really confident in your decision, # we recommend leaving this value at its default (changing it once the network is # already up and running is problematic). casemapping: "precis" # enforce-utf8 controls whether the server will preemptively discard non-UTF8 # messages (since they cannot be relayed to websocket clients), or will allow # them and relay them to non-websocket clients (as in traditional IRC). enforce-utf8: true # whether to look up user hostnames with reverse DNS # (to suppress this for privacy purposes, use the ip-cloaking options below) lookup-hostnames: true # whether to confirm hostname lookups using "forward-confirmed reverse DNS", i.e., for # any hostname returned from reverse DNS, resolve it back to an IP address and reject it # unless it matches the connecting IP forward-confirm-hostnames: true # use ident protocol to get usernames check-ident: false # ignore the supplied user/ident string from the USER command, always setting user/ident # to the following literal value; this can potentially reduce confusion and simplify bans. # the value must begin with a '~' character. comment out / omit to disable: coerce-ident: '~u' # password to login to the server # generated using "oragono genpasswd" #password: "" # motd filename # if you change the motd, you should move it to ircd.motd motd: /mnt/gluster01/oragono/ircd.motd # motd formatting codes # if this is true, the motd is escaped using formatting codes like $c, $b, and $i motd-formatting: true # relaying using the RELAYMSG command relaymsg: # is relaymsg enabled at all? enabled: true # which character(s) are reserved for relayed nicks? separators: "/" # can channel operators use RELAYMSG in their channels? # our implementation of RELAYMSG makes it safe for chanops to use without the # possibility of real users being silently spoofed available-to-chanops: true # addresses/CIDRs the PROXY command can be used from # this should be restricted to 127.0.0.1/8 and ::1/128 (unless you have a good reason) # you should also add these addresses to the connection limits and throttling exemption lists proxy-allowed-from: - localhost # - "192.168.1.1" # - "192.168.10.1/24" - 192.168.0.10 - 192.168.0.110 # controls the use of the WEBIRC command (by IRC<->web interfaces, bouncers and similar) webirc: # one webirc block -- should correspond to one set of gateways - # SHA-256 fingerprint of the TLS certificate the gateway must use to connect # (comment this out to use passwords only) # fingerprint: "abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789" # password the gateway uses to connect, made with oragono genpasswd password: "$WEBIRC1" # addresses/CIDRs that can use this webirc command # you should also add these addresses to the connection limits and throttling exemption lists hosts: - localhost # - "192.168.1.1" # - "192.168.10.1/24" - password: "$WEBIRC2" hosts: - localhost - password: "$WEBIRC3" hosts: - localhost - password: "$WEBIRC4" hosts: - localhost - # Convos password: "$WEBIRC5" hosts: - localhost - # Biboumi password: "$WEBIRC6" hosts: - localhost - # Webreg password: "$WEBIRC7" hosts: - localhost #- # password: "$WEBIRC8" # # hosts: # - "45.157.178.113" #- # password: "$WEBIRC9" # hosts: # - "45.157.178.113" # allow use of the RESUME extension over plaintext connections: # do not enable this unless the ircd is only accessible over internal networks allow-plaintext-resume: false # maximum length of clients' sendQ in bytes # this should be big enough to hold bursts of channel/direct messages max-sendq: 96k # compatibility with legacy clients compatibility: # many clients require that the final parameter of certain messages be an # RFC1459 trailing parameter, i.e., prefixed with :, whether or not this is # actually required. this forces Oragono to send those parameters # as trailings. this is recommended unless you're testing clients for conformance; # defaults to true when unset for that reason. force-trailing: true # some clients (ZNC 1.6.x and lower, Pidgin 2.12 and lower) do not # respond correctly to SASL messages with the server name as a prefix: # https://github.com/znc/znc/issues/1212 # this works around that bug, allowing them to use SASL. send-unprefixed-sasl: true allow-truncation: true # IP-based DoS protection ip-limits: # whether to limit the total number of concurrent connections per IP/CIDR count: true # maximum concurrent connections per IP/CIDR max-concurrent-connections: 16 # whether to restrict the rate of new connections per IP/CIDR throttle: true # how long to keep track of connections for window: 10m # maximum number of new connections per IP/CIDR within the given duration max-connections-per-window: 32 # how long to ban offenders for. after banning them, the number of connections is # reset, which lets you use /UNDLINE to unban people throttle-ban-duration: 10m # how wide the CIDR should be for IPv4 (a /32 is a fully specified IPv4 address) cidr-len-ipv4: 32 # how wide the CIDR should be for IPv6 (a /64 is the typical prefix assigned # by an ISP to an individual customer for their LAN) cidr-len-ipv6: 64 # IPs/networks which are exempted from connection limits exempted: - "localhost" - "127.0.0.1" - "127.0.0.2" # - "45.85.218.46" # - "172.17.0.1" - 192.168.0.110 # - "2001:0db8::/32" # custom connection limits for certain IPs/networks. note that CIDR # widths defined here override the default CIDR width --- the limit # will apply to the entire CIDR no matter how large or small it is custom-limits: # "8.8.0.0/16": # max-concurrent-connections: 128 # max-connections-per-window: 1024 ip-check-script: enabled: false command: "/opt/oragono/oragono-dnsbl" # constant list of args to pass to the command; the actual query # and result are transmitted over stdin/stdout: args: ['/opt/oragono/config.yaml'] # timeout for process execution, after which we send a SIGTERM: timeout: 9s # how long after the SIGTERM before we follow up with a SIGKILL: kill-timeout: 1s # how many scripts are allowed to run at once? 0 for no limit: max-concurrency: 64 # IP cloaking hides users' IP addresses from other users and from channel admins # (but not from server admins), while still allowing channel admins to ban # offending IP addresses or networks. In place of hostnames derived from reverse # DNS, users see fake domain names like pwbs2ui4377257x8.oragono. These names are # generated deterministically from the underlying IP address, but if the underlying # IP is not already known, it is infeasible to recover it from the cloaked name. ip-cloaking: # whether to enable IP cloaking enabled: true # whether to use these cloak settings (specifically, `netname` and `num-bits`) # to produce unique hostnames for always-on clients. you can enable this even if # you disabled IP cloaking for normal clients above. if this is disabled, # always-on clients will all have an identical hostname (the server name). enabled-for-always-on: true # fake TLD at the end of the hostname, e.g., pwbs2ui4377257x8.oragono netname: "liberta.casa" # secret key to prevent dictionary attacks against cloaked IPs # any high-entropy secret is valid for this purpose: # you MUST generate a new one for your installation. # suggestion: use the output of `oragono mksecret` # note that rotating this key will invalidate all existing ban masks. secret: "$CLOAKSEC" # name of an environment variable to pull the secret from, for use with # k8s secret distribution: # secret-environment-variable: "ORAGONO_CLOAKING_SECRET" # the cloaked hostname is derived only from the CIDR (most significant bits # of the IP address), up to a configurable number of bits. this is the # granularity at which bans will take effect for IPv4. Note that changing # this value will invalidate any stored bans. cidr-len-ipv4: 32 # analogous granularity for IPv6 cidr-len-ipv6: 64 # number of bits of hash output to include in the cloaked hostname. # more bits means less likelihood of distinct IPs colliding, # at the cost of a longer cloaked hostname. if this value is set to 0, # all users will receive simply `netname` as their cloaked hostname. num-bits: 64 # secure-nets identifies IPs and CIDRs which are secure at layer 3, # for example, because they are on a trusted internal LAN or a VPN. # plaintext connections from these IPs and CIDRs will be considered # secure (clients will receive the +Z mode and be allowed to resume # or reattach to secure connections). note that loopback IPs are always # considered secure: secure-nets: # - "10.0.0.0/8" # the hostname used by "services", e.g., NickServ, defaults to "localhost", # e.g., `NickServ!NickServ@localhost`. uncomment this to override: #override-services-hostname: "liberta.casa" # account options accounts: # is account authentication enabled, i.e., can users log into existing accounts? authentication-enabled: true # account registration registration: # can users register new accounts for themselves? if this is false, operators with # the `accreg` capability can still create accounts with `/NICKSERV SAREGISTER` enabled: true allow-before-connect: true # global throttle on new account creation throttling: enabled: true # window duration: 10m # number of attempts allowed within the window max-attempts: 30 # this is the bcrypt cost we'll use for account passwords bcrypt-cost: 4 # length of time a user has to verify their account before it can be re-registered #verify-timeout: "32h" # callbacks to allow #enabled-callbacks: # - mailto # example configuration for sending verification emails via a local mail relay #callbacks: # mailto: # sender: "admin@liberta.casa" # require-tls: true # dkim: # domain: "liberta.casa" # selector: "20200701" # key-file: "dkim.key" # throttle account login attempts (to prevent either password guessing, or DoS # attacks on the server aimed at forcing repeated expensive bcrypt computations) login-throttling: enabled: true # window duration: 1m # number of attempts allowed within the window max-attempts: 3 # some clients (notably Pidgin and Hexchat) offer only a single password field, # which makes it impossible to specify a separate server password (for the PASS # command) and SASL password. if this option is set to true, a client that # successfully authenticates with SASL will not be required to send # PASS as well, so it can be configured to authenticate with SASL only. skip-server-password: false # enable login to accounts via the PASS command, e.g., PASS account:password # this is sometimes useful for compatibility with old clients that don't support SASL login-via-pass-command: true # require-sasl controls whether clients are required to have accounts # (and sign into them using SASL) to connect to the server require-sasl: # if this is enabled, all clients must authenticate with SASL while connecting enabled: false # IPs/CIDRs which are exempted from the account requirement exempted: - "localhost" - "127.0.0.1" - "127.0.0.2" # - '10.10.0.0/16' # nick-reservation controls how, and whether, nicknames are linked to accounts nick-reservation: # is there any enforcement of reserved nicknames? enabled: true # how many nicknames, in addition to the account name, can be reserved? additional-nick-limit: 2 # method describes how nickname reservation is handled # timeout: let the user change to the registered nickname, give them X seconds # to login and then rename them if they haven't done so # strict: don't let the user change to the registered nickname unless they're # already logged-in using SASL or NickServ # optional: no enforcement by default, but allow users to opt in to # the enforcement level of their choice # # 'optional' matches the behavior of other NickServs, but 'strict' is # preferable if all your users can enable SASL. method: strict # allow users to set their own nickname enforcement status, e.g., # to opt out of strict enforcement allow-custom-enforcement: false # format for guest nicknames: # 1. these nicknames cannot be registered or reserved # 2. if a client is automatically renamed by the server, # this is the template that will be used (e.g., Guest-nccj6rgmt97cg) # 3. if enforce-guest-format (see below) is enabled, clients without # a registered account will have this template applied to their # nicknames (e.g., 'katie' will become 'Guest-katie') guest-nickname-format: "JDoe-*" # when enabled, forces users not logged into an account to use # a nickname matching the guest template. a caveat: this may prevent # users from choosing nicknames in scripts different from the guest # nickname format. force-guest-format: false # when enabled, forces users logged into an account to use the # account name as their nickname. when combined with strict nickname # enforcement, this lets users treat nicknames and account names # as equivalent for the purpose of ban/invite/exception lists. force-nick-equals-account: true # parallel setting to force-nick-equals-account: if true, this forbids # anonymous users (i.e., users not logged into an account) to change their # nickname after the initial connection is complete forbid-anonymous-nick-changes: false # multiclient controls whether oragono allows multiple connections to # attach to the same client/nickname identity; this is part of the # functionality traditionally provided by a bouncer like ZNC multiclient: # when disabled, each connection must use a separate nickname (as is the # typical behavior of IRC servers). when enabled, a new connection that # has authenticated with SASL can associate itself with an existing # client enabled: true # if this is disabled, clients have to opt in to bouncer functionality # using nickserv or the cap system. if it's enabled, they can opt out # via nickserv allowed-by-default: true # whether to allow clients that remain on the server even # when they have no active connections. The possible values are: # "disabled", "opt-in", "opt-out", or "mandatory". always-on: "opt-in" auto-away: "opt-in" # vhosts controls the assignment of vhosts (strings displayed in place of the user's # hostname/IP) by the HostServ service vhosts: # are vhosts enabled at all? enabled: true # maximum length of a vhost max-length: 64 # regexp for testing the validity of a vhost # (make sure any changes you make here are RFC-compliant) valid-regexp: '^[0-9A-Za-z.\-_/]+$' # options controlling users requesting vhosts: user-requests: # can users request vhosts at all? if this is false, operators with the # 'vhosts' capability can still assign vhosts manually enabled: true # if uncommented, all new vhost requests will be dumped into the given # channel, so opers can review them as they are sent in. ensure that you # have registered and restricted the channel appropriately before you # uncomment this. #channel: "#vhosts" # after a user's vhost has been approved or rejected, they need to wait # this long (starting from the time of their original request) # before they can request a new one. cooldown: 30m # vhosts that users can take without approval, using `/HS TAKE` offer-list: #- "liberta.casa" # modes that are set by default when a user connects # if unset, no user modes will be set by default # +i is invisible (a user's channels are hidden from whois replies) # see /QUOTE HELP umodes for more user modes default-user-modes: +iT # channel options channels: # modes that are set when new channels are created # +n is no-external-messages and +t is op-only-topic # see /QUOTE HELP cmodes for more channel modes default-modes: +nt # how many channels can a client be in at once? max-channels-per-client: 100 # if this is true, new channels can only be created by operators with the # `chanreg` operator capability operator-only-creation: false # channel registration - requires an account registration: # can users register new channels? enabled: true # how many channels can each account register? max-channels-per-account: 15 list-delay: 2s invite-expiration: 24h # operator classes oper-classes: # chat moderator: can ban/unban users from the server, join channels, # fix mode issues and sort out vhosts. "chat-moderator": # title shown in WHOIS title: Chat Moderator # capability names capabilities: - "kill" - "ban" - "nofakelag" - "roleplay" - "relaymsg" - "vhosts" - "sajoin" - "samode" - "snomasks" # server admin: has full control of the ircd, including nickname and # channel registrations "server-admin": # title shown in WHOIS title: Server Admin # oper class this extends from extends: "chat-moderator" # capability names capabilities: - "rehash" - "accreg" - "chanreg" - "history" - "defcon" - "massmessage" "systems": title: System capabilities: - "nofakelag" # ircd operators opers: # operator named 'admin' mogad0n: # which capabilities this oper has access to class: "server-admin" # custom whois line whois-line: ... # custom hostname vhost: "mph.monster" # modes are the modes to auto-set upon opering-up modes: +is acdjknoqtuxv # operators can be authenticated either by password (with the /OPER command), # or by certificate fingerprint, or both. if a password hash is set, then a # password is required to oper up (e.g., /OPER dan mypassword). to generate # the hash, use `oragono genpasswd`. #password: "$OPPW1" # if a SHA-256 certificate fingerprint is configured here, then it will be # required to /OPER. if you comment out the password hash above, then you can # /OPER without a password. fingerprint: "$OPFP1" # if 'auto' is set (and no password hash is set), operator permissions will be # granted automatically as soon as you connect with the right fingerprint. auto: true katyusha: class: "server-admin" whois-line: ^_^ vhost: "bot" hidden: true modes: +is acdjknoqtuxv password: "$OPPW2" shodan: class: "server-admin" whois-line: ^_^ vhost: "bot.overs33r" hidden: true modes: +is acdjknoqtuxv password: "$OPPW3" cranberry: class: "server-admin" whois-line: Love vhost: "cranberry.juice" modes: +is acdjknoqtuxv fingerprint: "$OPFP2" auto: true Mikaela: class: "server-admin" whois-line: Meow vhost: "darkness.dreamer.of.cats" modes: +is acdjknoqtuxv fingerprint: "$OPFP3" auto: true TripityDudeGuy: class: "chat-moderator" whois-line: lol@rehab vhost: "wood" modes: +is acjknoqtuxv #password: "$OPPW5" fingerprint: "$OPFP4" auto: true exorcist: class: "server-admin" whois-line: F society vhost: "libre.software" modes: +is acdjknoqtuxv password: "$OPPW6" syslog: class: "systems" modes: +BTRi password: "$OPPW7" # logging, takes inspiration from Insp logging: - # how to log these messages # # file log to given target filename # stdout log to stdout # stderr log to stderr # (you can specify multiple methods, e.g., to log to both stderr and a file) method: stderr # filename to log to, if file method is selected # filename: ircd.log # type(s) of logs to keep here. you can use - to exclude those types # # exclusions take precedent over inclusions, so if you exclude a type it will NEVER # be logged, even if you explicitly include it # # useful types include: # * everything (usually used with exclusing some types below) # server server startup, rehash, and shutdown events # accounts account registration and authentication # channels channel creation and operations # commands command calling and operations # opers oper actions, authentication, etc # services actions related to NickServ, ChanServ, etc. # internal unexpected runtime behavior, including potential bugs # userinput raw lines sent by users # useroutput raw lines sent to users type: "* -userinput -useroutput" # one of: debug info warn error level: debug #- # # example of a file log that avoids logging IP addresses # method: file # filename: ircd.log # type: "* -userinput -useroutput -localconnect -localconnect-ip" # level: debug # debug options debug: # when enabled, oragono will attempt to recover from certain kinds of # client-triggered runtime errors that would normally crash the server. # this makes the server more resilient to DoS, but could result in incorrect # behavior. deployments that would prefer to "start from scratch", e.g., by # letting the process crash and auto-restarting it with systemd, can set # this to false. recover-from-errors: true # optionally expose a pprof http endpoint: https://golang.org/pkg/net/http/pprof/ # it is strongly recommended that you don't expose this on a public interface; # if you need to access it remotely, you can use an SSH tunnel. # set to `null`, "", leave blank, or omit to disable # pprof-listener: "localhost:6060" # datastore configuration datastore: # path to the datastore path: /mnt/gluster01/oragono/ircd.db # if the database schema requires an upgrade, `autoupgrade` will attempt to # perform it automatically on startup. the database will be backed # up, and if the upgrade fails, the original database will be restored. autoupgrade: true # connection information for MySQL (currently only used for persistent history): mysql: enabled: false host: "localhost" # port is unnecessary for connections via unix domain socket: #port: 3306 user: "oragono" password: "hunter2" history-database: "oragono_history" timeout: 3s # languages config languages: # whether to load languages enabled: false # default language to use for new clients # 'en' is the default English language in the code default: en # which directory contains our language files path: /opt/oragono/languages # limits - these need to be the same across the network limits: # nicklen is the max nick length allowed nicklen: 32 # identlen is the max ident length allowed identlen: 20 # channellen is the max channel length allowed channellen: 64 # awaylen is the maximum length of an away message awaylen: 390 # kicklen is the maximum length of a kick message kicklen: 390 # topiclen is the maximum length of a channel topic topiclen: 390 # maximum number of monitor entries a client can have monitor-entries: 100 # whowas entries to store whowas-entries: 100 # maximum length of channel lists (beI modes) chan-list-modes: 60 # maximum number of messages to accept during registration (prevents # DoS / resource exhaustion attacks): registration-messages: 1024 # message length limits for the new multiline cap multiline: max-bytes: 4096 # 0 means disabled max-lines: 100 # 0 means no limit # fakelag: prevents clients from spamming commands too rapidly fakelag: # whether to enforce fakelag enabled: true # time unit for counting command rates window: 1s # clients can send this many commands without fakelag being imposed burst-limit: 5 # once clients have exceeded their burst allowance, they can send only # this many commands per `window`: messages-per-window: 2 # client status resets to the default state if they go this long without # sending any commands: cooldown: 2s # the roleplay commands are semi-standardized extensions to IRC that allow # sending and receiving messages from pseudo-nicknames. this can be used either # for actual roleplaying, or for bridging IRC with other protocols. roleplay: # are roleplay commands enabled at all? (channels and clients still have to # opt in individually with the +E mode) enabled: true # require the "roleplay" oper capability to send roleplay messages? require-oper: false # require channel operator permissions to send roleplay messages? require-chanops: true # add the real nickname, in parentheses, to the end of every roleplay message? add-suffix: false # message history tracking, for the RESUME extension and possibly other uses in future history: # should we store messages for later playback? # by default, messages are stored in RAM only; they do not persist # across server restarts. however, you should not enable this unless you understand # how it interacts with the GDPR and/or any data privacy laws that apply # in your country and the countries of your users. enabled: true # how many channel-specific events (messages, joins, parts) should be tracked per channel? channel-length: 2048 # how many direct messages and notices should be tracked per user? client-length: 256 # how long should we try to preserve messages? # if `autoresize-window` is 0, the in-memory message buffers are preallocated to # their maximum length. if it is nonzero, the buffers are initially small and # are dynamically expanded up to the maximum length. if the buffer is full # and the oldest message is older than `autoresize-window`, then it will overwrite # the oldest message rather than resize; otherwise, it will expand if possible. autoresize-window: 3d # number of messages to automatically play back on channel join (0 to disable): autoreplay-on-join: 0 # maximum number of CHATHISTORY messages that can be # requested at once (0 disables support for CHATHISTORY) chathistory-maxmessages: 100 # maximum number of messages that can be replayed at once during znc emulation # (znc.in/playback, or automatic replay on initial reattach to a persistent client): znc-maxmessages: 2048 # options to delete old messages, or prevent them from being retrieved restrictions: # if this is set, messages older than this cannot be retrieved by anyone # (and will eventually be deleted from persistent storage, if that's enabled) expire-time: 1w # if this is set, logged-in users cannot retrieve messages older than their # account registration date, and logged-out users cannot retrieve messages # older than their sign-on time (modulo grace-period, see below): enforce-registration-date: false # but if this is set, you can retrieve messages that are up to `grace-period` # older than the above cutoff time. this is recommended to allow logged-out # users to do session resumption / query history after disconnections. grace-period: 1h # options to store history messages in a persistent database (currently only MySQL): persistent: enabled: false # store unregistered channel messages in the persistent database? unregistered-channels: false # for a registered channel, the channel owner can potentially customize # the history storage setting. as the server operator, your options are # 'disabled' (no persistent storage, regardless of per-channel setting), # 'opt-in', 'opt-out', and 'mandatory' (force persistent storage, ignoring # per-channel setting): registered-channels: "opt-out" # direct messages are only stored in the database for logged-in clients; # you can control how they are stored here (same options as above). # if you enable this, strict nickname reservation is strongly recommended # as well. direct-messages: "opt-out" # options to control how messages are stored and deleted: retention: # allow users to delete their own messages from history? allow-individual-delete: false # options to control storage of TAGMSG tagmsg-storage: # by default, should TAGMSG be stored? default: false # if `default` is false, store TAGMSG containing any of these tags: whitelist: - "+draft/react" - "react"